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In 2004, a section was added to the German Protection against Dismissal Act, establishing a 
new procedure to dismiss an employee, given a predetermined severance payment. Most legal 
scholars presume the change to be without impact, while a minority of experts claims it to be 
either beneficial or unfavourable to employees. Our theoretical model suggests that firms will 
use the new procedure, but that the change in payoffs is indeterminate and, therefore, an 
empirical issue. Exploiting the fact that collective dismissals are not directly affected by the 
amendment, difference-in-differences estimates based on panel data for West Germany 
indicate that the legal change did have a negative effect on severance pay. 
JEL-Code: J65, K31, C23. 







Department of Economics 






University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld 










This version: 28.06.2010 
We are grateful to Malte Mosel, Wendy Smith as well as to seminar participants in Duisburg 
and at CESifo (Munich) for helpful comments.   1 
1. Introduction 
Employment protection legislation in Germany is generally regarded as comparatively strict. 
In  addition,  the  number  of  dismissals  resulting  in  labour  court  cases  is  relatively  high 
(Bertola, Boeri and Cazes 1999; OECD 2004). The overwhelming majority of these cases 
results  in  a  termination  of  the  employment  contract,  often  involving  severance  payments 
(Höland, Kahl and Zeibig 2007, pp. 183, 202). In response to these features, the main law 
regulating dismissals in Germany, the Protection against Dismissal Act (PaDA), was amended 
in 2004. In particular, a clause was added (PaDA Sec. 1a) which allows a firm to terminate a 
regular  employment  contract  if,  first,  it  makes  a  severance  payment  of  a  predetermined 
magnitude and, second, the employee does not object to the dismissal. Since the new section 
was added to the law, yet all other regulations remained in place, the government explicitly 
argued that "employee and employer need not fear any deterioration of their legal position" 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003a, p. 9). The majority of legal scholars hold the view that PaDA 
Sec. 1a will not be applied and will have no impact on individual dismissals because the legal 
situation effectively remains unchanged (cf. Spilger 2009). Alternatively, it is occasionally 
argued that the level of severance pay defined by PaDA Sec. 1a represents a minimum, since 
no employee has an incentive to accept a lower payment. Finally, trade unions have feared 
that the law's amendment will be disadvantageous to workers.  
In  this  paper,  we  inquire  which  of  the  above  evaluations  is  adequate.  Since  there  is  no 
comprehensive body of data on the legal source of a dismissal in Germany, we assess the 
effect of PaDA Sec. 1a indirectly by calculating the impact on observed severance payments. 
More precisely, we exploit the fact that PaDA Sec. 1a does not apply to collective dismissals 
in firms with more than 20 employees in which a works councils exists. Using a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach and representative panel data for the years 2001 to 2006 for West 
Germany, we can identify the (short-run) effect of PaDA Sec. 1a on observed severance pay 
and thereby assess its consequences. 
In  the  next  section,  we  outline  the  legal  rules  governing  dismissals  in  Germany  and  the 
amendment of the PaDA. We also summarise the discussion among legal scholars regarding 
the  new  norm  and  previous  analyses  of  its  impact.  In  Section  3  we  develop  a  simple 
theoretical  model  which  allows  us  to  investigate  the  incentives  for  a  firm  to  proceed  in 
accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a. For a subgroup of dismissed workers which we can identify 
in our empirical analysis, we derive a simple condition determining the change in severance 
payments. Additionally, the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a is shown to have an ambiguous 
impact on the average payments. From a theoretical perspective, therefore, the new regulation   2 
may be beneficial or unfavourable to workers. In Section 4, we describe our data and outline 
our  empirical  strategy,  and  in  Section  5  we  report  our  findings.  We  observe  an  overall 
increase  in  average  severance  payments,  while  our  DID-estimates  indicate  that  payments 
resulting  from  mutual  agreements  between  a  firm  and  an  employee  and  from  individual 
dismissals have declined since 2004, relative to those paid in the case of collective dismissals. 
This  suggests  that  firms  indeed  use  the  option  of  terminating  an  employment  contract  in 
accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a, and that those dismissed workers who may have been affected 
by the new regulation receive lower severance payments, relative to the amount they would 
have received without the law's amendment.  
 
2. Legal Background 
2.1 Employment Protection Legislation and Further Regulations 
In  the  context  of  German  individual  labour  law,  the  Civil  Code  and,  in  particular,  the 
Protection  against  Dismissal  Act  (PaDA)  govern  the  termination  of  regular  employment 
contracts.
1 The Civil Code Sec. 622 stipulates a notice period for ordinary dismissals for all 
employees whose trial period of no more than 6 months has expired, which increases with 
tenure. However, periods of employment taking place before an individual has reached the 
age of 25 are not taken into account. In addition, Civil Code Sec. 626 governs extraordinary 
(i.e. summary) dismissals.  
PaDA Sec. 1(1) states that the termination of an employment contract that has existed for 
more than 6 months becomes void if it is socially unjustifiable. A dismissal is deemed socially 
unjustifiable which "is not based upon reasons pertaining to the person or the behaviour of the 
employee,  or  on  urgent  operational  requirements  that  are  an  obstacle  to  the  employee 
remaining  employed  by  the  establishment."
2  In  the  case  of  operational  dismissals,  the 
selection of employees to be made redundant must take place on the basis of specific criteria 
(so-called social selection; PaDA Sec. 1(3)), which currently include tenure, age, alimony 
obligations, and severe disabilities.  
An  employee  can,  claiming  that  the  dismissal  is  socially  unjustifiable  or  void  on  other 
grounds, sue the firm to obtain a judgement that the employment contract has not ceased. 
According to the Labour Court Law, Sec. 54, the first step in the ensuing court procedure is a 
                                                 
1 In addition, there are special regulations, for example, for the disabled, employees taking maternity or parental 
leave, members of works councils and apprentices.  
2 This and all other translations of legal sources from German have been rendered by the authors.   3 
conciliatory hearing. During this hearing, the judge will, in many cases, propose an amicable 
settlement. If no such settlement can be found, a second hearing is arranged. Here, too, it is 
often the case that attempts are made to end the lawsuit via an amicable settlement. In cases 
dealt with by labour courts, each party generally bears the costs of the legal dispute itself. 
Furthermore, representation by a lawyer is not compulsory (Labour Court Law, Sec. 11, 12a).  
Even if the labour court decides that the dismissal was void, it is unlikely that employment 
will continue.
3 According to PaDA Sec. 9, the court has the option of terminating the contract, 
either if continuation of employment is not to be expected of the employee, or if "further 
cooperation between employer and employee serving the objectives of the firm" cannot be 
expected. Only in this case a verdict must include an "appropriate severance payment". In the 
PaDA there are no detailed specifications regarding its amount. PaDA Sec. 10 stipulates only 
an  upper  limit  of  12  monthly  salaries,  which  increases  to  15  (18)  monthly  salaries  for 
employees who have reached the age of 50 (55) and have a tenure of at least 15 (20) years.  
At  the  beginning  of  2004,  the  PaDA  was  altered.  In  particular,  it  may  now  basically  be 
applied only to employees who work in firms which will typically have 10 or more staff (Sec. 
23(I)),  and  no  longer  to  firms  with  between  5  and  10  employees.  In  addition  to  further 
amendments, a new clause – Sec. 1a – was added: 
"(1)  If  an  employer  dismisses  an  employee  on  the  basis  of  urgent  operational 
requirements …, and if the employee takes no legal action … before the deadline laid 
down in Sec. 4 Sentence 1, then the employee becomes entitled to severance pay upon 
the expiration of the notice period. The employer is required to state in the dismissal 
notification that the dismissal is due to urgent operational requirements and that the 
employee can claim the severance payment as a result of allowing the period to elapse 
during which the employer can be sued. 
(2)  The  amount  of  severance  pay  is  equal  to  0.5  monthly  salaries  for  each  year  of 
employment. …." 
Sentence  1  restricts  the  applicability  to  urgent  operational  reasons.  However,  the  second 
sentence qualifies this restriction, stating that the employer is to refer to such a requirement 
but not, however, that it necessarily constitutes the actual reason for the dismissal. Indeed, the 
opinion is widely held that if an employer has made the required reference and the employee 
has not filed a suit, there is an entitlement to severance pay, irrespective of whether or not the 
dismissal is due to operational requirements.
4  
                                                 
3 For 2003, Höland et al. (2007, pp. 202 ff) calculate an upper limit of 15% for the probability that a dismissal 
protection case led to a revocation of the dismissal, but conjecture that the actual proportion of continuing 
employment contracts is considerably lower. 
4 Cf., e.g., Maschmann (2003, p. 7), Bader (2004, p. 71), Däubler (2004, p. 178), Preis (2004, p. 73), Quecke 
(2004, p. 95), Tschöpe (2004, p. 197), Raab (2005, p. 6), Hoyningen-Huene and Linck (2007, p. 368), and   4 
Collective labour law also contains a series of guidelines related to dismissal protection rights. 
If a works council exists, it must be heard before each dismissal according to the Works 
Constitution  Act  (WCA)  Sec.  102.  Otherwise,  the  dismissal  becomes  void.  There  are 
additional  regulations  for  collective  dismissals.  WCA  Sec.  112  states  that  "in  firms  with 
generally more than 20 employees entitled to elect a works council, the management must 
inform the works council in a comprehensive and timely manner about planned operational 
changes that could entail considerable disadvantages for the workforce or substantial parts of 
the workforce, and must evaluate the planned operational changes together with the works 
council." Furthermore, WCA Sec. 112a explicitly states that if a planned operational change 
consists solely of the dismissal of workers, the company is obliged to arrange a so-called 
social plan if the number of dismissed workers due to operational reasons exceeds certain 
thresholds. The social plan will typically contain guidelines on severance payments. If the 
works council and the employer cannot agree on the contents of a social plan, WCA Sec. 112 
entrusts an arbitration committee with the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, in the case 
of collective dismissals, employers will not have to establish a social plan if there is no works 
council,
5  but  in  its  presence  cannot  circumvent  this  obligation  by  offering  employees  a 
severance payment in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a.
6 Therefore, PaDA Sec. 1a is unlikely to 
have an impact on the level of severance payments in the case of collective dismissals in firms 
with  20  or  more  employees  in  which  a  works  council  exists.  We  use  this  fact  in  our 
differences-in-differences  specification  to  assess  the  causal  effect  of  PaDA  Sec.  1a  on 
severance payments. Note, however, that in 2009, works councils existed in only 10% of all 
private sector firms employing five or more workers in West Germany. These firms employed 
45% of all workers (Ellguth and Kohaut 2010). The latter fraction declined from 50% in 2001 
to 47% in 2004, when the PaDA was amended, and rises with firm size. 
Also  relevant  to  this  study  are  legal  changes  regarding  unemployment  benefits  and  the 
taxation of severance pay that came into effect during the period covered by our empirical 
investigation. At the beginning of 2005, income-related unemployment assistance primarily 
paid to long-term unemployed was replaced by a flat-rate so-called Arbeitslosengeld II, and 
                                                                                                                                                          
Spilger (2009, pp. 235 f). Rolfs (2006) evidently holds a different opinion. Hergenröder (2009, PaDA Sec. 1a, 
para. 9-19, 30) essentially agrees with the view that only the reference to the reason for the dismissal (Sentence 
2) must deem it a redundancy, but points out that the employee must have the option to appeal in the case of 
malicious deception (see also Quecke 2004, p. 95 and Hesse 2007, para. 9a). Kögel (2009, p. 363) appears to 
completely rule out the possibility of an appeal. 
5 See, for example, Däubler, Kittner and Klebe (2008, p. 1977) or Fabricius (2010, p. 1587). 
6 See, for example, Spilger (2009, p. 258). However, if a social plan has been agreed upon and the firm then 
proposes to terminate the employment contract of an employee in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a, this will be 
feasible if the resulting severance payment exceeds the payment determined according to the social plan.   5 
about a year later the maximum entitlement period for benefits – termed Arbeitslosengeld I – 
was reduced for unemployed persons above the age of 45 years. The second important change 
from  the  perspective  of  our  investigation  is  the  reduction  of  the  income  tax  exemption 
threshold for severance payments from about € 8,200 to € 7,200 on 1 January 2004. For 
employees  over  50  (55)  years  of  age  with  a  tenure  of  more  than  15  (20)  years,  the 
corresponding threshold of roughly € 10,300 (€ 12,300) was reduced to € 9,000 (€ 10,800), 
that is, by larger absolute amounts than for the large majority of employees. At the start of 
2006, the tax exemption thresholds for severance payments were completely abolished. Once 
again, the absolute reductions were larger for older employees with high tenure, where the 
relevant thresholds are defined by PaDA Sec. 10. 
 
2.2 Previous Analyses of PaDA Sec. 1a 
From a legal perspective, the dominant view of PaDA Sec. 1a is that it has not had and will 
not have an effect.
7 The prevailing justification for this evaluation is that even before PaDA 
Sec. 1a was introduced, firms and employees had the option to agree on a severance payment 
as part of a mutual agreement to terminate the employment contract. As this option still exists, 
there are no incentives for firms to proceed in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a. Rather, the 
legal situation remains essentially unchanged.
8 Alternatively, it is claimed that an offer made 
according to PaDA Sec. 1a would be taken as a signal of the firm's uncertainty regarding the 
legal evaluation of the dismissal, constituting an invitation for the employee to take legal 
action.
9 It is therefore occasionally proffered in the legal and also economic debate that a 
severance payment calculated according to PaDA Sec. 1a represents a lower limit.
10 Only the 
Confederation  of  German  Trade  Unions  held  the  opinion  that  the  regulations  for  "the 
employee  …  by  no  means  [constitute]  a  profit",  while  employers  were  said  to  benefit 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003b, p. 9).
11  
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Bauer and Krieger (2004, p. 79), Preis (2004, pp. 72, 79), Wolff (2004, p. 381), Raab (2005, p. 12), 
Rolfs (2006, p. 41), Hesse (2007, para. 2), Hoyningen-Huene and Linck (2007, p. 368), and Spilger (2009, p. 
229). Merz (2006, pp. 213 f) and Kögel (2009, p. 367) are less sceptical. 
8 See, e.g., Maschmann (2003, 6), Preis (2004, pp. 71 f), and Kortstock (2007, p. 297).  
9 See Bader (2004, p. 70), Bauer and Krieger (2004, p. 77), Preis (2004, p. 75), Wolf (2004, p. 381) and Kögel 
(2009, p. 367). Merz (2006, p. 211) provides further references. 
10 See Maschmann (2003, 12), Bader (2004, p. 70), Tschöpe (2004, p. 199), Wolff (2004, p. 381), Jahn and 
Walwei (2005), Jahn (2009), and May and Schellhaaß (2009).  
11 This view was stated in a parliamentary hearing of the German parliament (the Bundestag). It should be noted 
that a similar view is expressed in a study by the Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, a research institute associated 
with German employer confederations: "As … severance payments according to PaDA Sec. 1a are also included 
in the calculations – the amount of which should generally lie beneath those otherwise paid – … ." (Hardege and 
Schmitz 2008, p. 36, own translation).   6 
Until now, the impact of PaDA Sec. 1a has not been explored empirically, allowing for causal 
interpretations. Jahn (2009) analyses the determinants of the level of severance payments for 
the years 2000-2006 in West and East Germany. Her set-up includes a dummy for the years 
2004-2006. She interprets the significant positive coefficient as evidence that the 2004 PaDA 
reform established a lower limit for severance payments. Goerke and Pannenberg (2010b) 
investigate the so-called severance pay factor before and after the introduction of PaDA Sec. 
1a, i. e. the multiple of the wage that is paid as severance payment per year of tenure. They 
show theoretically that severance pay factors are likely to bunch around 0.5, the value defined 
by PaDA Sec. 1a, subsequent its introduction and find substantive descriptive evidence for 
such a development. However, their semi-parametric decomposition analysis does not permit 
a causal interpretation. 
 
3. Theoretical Analysis 
The theoretical investigation will focus on the firm's and employee's behaviour in the event of 
an individual dismissal in which PaDA Sec. 1a is in principle applicable. Initially, we will 
analyse the incentives for a firm to (1) dismiss an employee without a severance pay offer, (2) 
propose a mutual agreement including a severance payment determined in an optimal manner 
by the firm in order to avoid a legal conflict, or (3) use the procedure laid down in PaDA Sec. 
1a. In each case, an employee dissatisfied with the firm's behaviour can file a labour court 
suit.  Our  model  can,  therefore,  generate  all  major  observable  outcomes  of  an  employer-
initiated individual contract termination: that is, an outright dismissal without any financial 
compensation; a dismissal involving a payment by the firm, either because employer and 
employee  mutually  agreed  on  a  contract  termination  including  such  a  disbursement,  or 
because  of  the  procedure  laid  down  in  PaDA  Sec.  1a;  and  finally,  a  court-induced 
compensation.  We  can  show  that  all  types  of  dismissals  can  arise  subsequent  to  the 
modification of the PaDA. We derive a simple condition for the change in observed severance 
payments,  conditional  on  these  payments  resulting  from  a  non-controversial  contract 
termination. By non-controversial we refer to a dismissal including a severance payment that 
resulted  without  a  court's  involvement.  Finally  we  investigate  the  change  in  the  average 
magnitude of severance payments.   7 
3.1 Analytical Framework 
The  starting  point  of  our  analysis  is  the  firm's  dismissal  decision.  Both  the  firm  and  the 
employee are risk-neutral. The firm minimises the expected costs resulting from a dismissal, 
while the employee maximises his expected payoff, consisting of direct payments and the 
monetary equivalent of non-monetary costs and gains.  
Initially, a player labelled 'Nature' selects the firm's direct costs associated with the three 
options described above. In particular, Nature 'chooses' the costs Kn, Kn ≥ 0, of dismissing an 
employee without a severance pay offer; the firm's costs Kc, Kc ≥ 0, of obtaining legal advice 
and of legal representation in the event that the dismissed employee has filed a labour court 
suit; and the costs Ks, Ks ≥ 0, arising if a mutual agreement including a voluntary payment is 
signed. The costs Kn can, for example, occur because the remaining workforce's productivity 
is affected negatively by a dismissal of a former colleague without a compensatory payment 
being  offered.  Alternatively,  costs  Kn  can  be  positive  because  customers  respond  to 
dismissals by purchasing substitute products from competitors. The firm's cost Kc of a court 
procedure will arise if the firm hires a lawyer or if staff from the personnel department need to 
prepare for and attend a court meeting. Finally, the costs Ks can, for example, represent the 
expenditure for judicial advice which ensures that the mutual agreement cannot be legally 
disputed  by  the  employee  in  order  to  obtain  further  payments.  Since  the  firm's  costs  in 
addition to a severance payment are likely to be lower in the case of a mutual agreement than 
those resulting from a court procedure, we assume Ks ≤ Kc. The costs Kn, Kc, and Ks are 
public knowledge.  
If the employee files a labour court suit, he will incur additional (opportunity) costs. These 
arise because of costly legal advice, the time needed for setting up the claim or because of a 
direct utility loss resulting from filing a suit. The monetary equivalent of these costs k is 
distributed uniformly on the interval [0,  k]. While the employee is aware of the exact value 
of k, the firm only knows the distribution when taking its decisions. We presume that the 
costs of a court procedure k and Kc arise, irrespective of what the outcome of the suit is. 
Furthermore, with the exception of a severance payment, which will be specified below, any 
payments to the (former) employee, such as unemployment benefits, occurring subsequently 
to the dismissal, are assumed to be given and, accordingly, normalised to zero.   8 
Assume that the firm chooses the first option and dismisses the employee without a severance 
pay offer. Such an action creates costs Kn to the firm, irrespective of the employee's response. 
If the employee consents, his payoff will be zero. However, if the employee does not accept 
the  dismissal,  this  entails  filing  a  labour  court  suit,  claiming  the  dismissal  to  be  socially 
unjustifiable.
12 Since we cannot observe in our data whether or not an employee filed a suit 
and how the firm responded if this was the case, in the theoretical analysis we assume that the 
firm  is  unable  to  react  to  the  employee's  action.  Moreover,  we  depict  the  whole  court 
procedure in a highly simplified manner and suppose that the employee obtains a severance 
payment with a positive probability. Its expected value is denoted by C. In consequence, the 
firm's expected costs, given a court procedure, equal C + Kc + Kn, while the employee's 
expected payoff is given by C – k. 
Suppose next that the firm proposes a mutual agreement, including a severance pay offer S,  
S > 0. If the employee accepts this proposal, he will receive the respective amount S, while 
the firm incurs costs S + Ks. A rejection of the proposal will be tantamount to filing a labour 
court  suit.  The  respective  payoffs  have  been  described  above.  They  are  assumed  to  be 
unaffected by the firm having made a severance pay offer because this proposal does not 
restrict  the  court's  legal  evaluation.  In  consequence,  the  firm's  expected  costs  of  a  court 
procedure equal C + Kc, whereas the employee's expected payoff is given by C – k. 
Since 2004, the firm can also proceed in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a. If the employee 
accepts the proposed payment, he will receive a monetary payment denoted by Z. In addition, 
we  allow  for  the  notion  of  PaDA  Sec.  1a  establishing  a  standard  or  norm  for  severance 
payments by assuming that an employee obtains an additional, non-monetary payoff. This 
payoff may result from being treated fairly in accordance with a perceived entitlement – such 
as is laid down in PaDA Sec. 1a – or because an employee attaches positive value to not being 
at the firm's discretion with respect to the magnitude of the payment. The monetary equivalent 
of this additional payoff is given by f, f ≥ 0. Since the legal requirements for a dismissal in 
accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a are less demanding than those that have to be observed in 
order to make a mutual agreement involving a payment S legally watertight, we normalise the 
firm's costs of legal advice if proceeding in line with PaDA Sec. 1a to zero. If the employee 
accepts the proposal of a contract termination in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a, the firm's 
costs therefore amount to Z, whereas the employee's payoff rises by Z + f. If the employee 
                                                 
12  Accordingly,  we  assume  in  our  theoretical  analysis  that  the  PaDA  applies.  Otherwise,  the  regulations 
concerning PaDA Sec. 1a cannot form the legal basis for the firm's behaviour.   9 
rejects the firm's proposal, this choice is equivalent to filing a labour court suit with costs k. 
As a direct consequence, the employee will no longer be entitled to the payment Z.
13 Once the 
offer Z is rejected, no further proposals or negotiations will be possible. Figure 1 depicts the 
feasible choices and resulting payoffs. 
Figure 1: Sequence of Decisions 
 
 
If the employee accepts a dismissal without a severance pay offer, his payoff will be zero. If 
he files a labour court suit, the expected value of his payoff equals C - k. In consequence, the 
employee will accept the dismissal if k > C. Given a uniform distribution of k on the interval 








=             (1) 
If the employee agrees to the firm's proposal of a mutual agreement including a severance 
payment S, his payoff will amount to S. The employee will accept the offer S if S > C - k 
holds. Hence, the probability q(S) of acceptance is given by: 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Preis (2004, pp. 74 f), Raab (2005, pp. 8 f), Hergenröder (2009, Sec. 1a para. 15 ff), Hesse (2007, 
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By analogy, the employee will consent to a proposed termination of the employment contract 
in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a, if Z + f > C - k applies. The probability of the firm's offer 










=           (3) 
If the firm proposes a mutual agreement, it will choose the severance pay offer S such that the 
fall in expected costs due to the increase in the acceptance probability q(S) just balances the 
additional costs owing to a higher payment if the offer is accepted. Therefore, the optimal 
offer S* results from the maximisation of Π(S). 
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In consequence, S* is given by: 
2
k s K c K
C * S
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+ =             (5) 
Since the probability q(S) cannot exceed unity, the optimal offer S* has to be less than the 
expected payment C resulting from a court's involvement (given an interior solution). The 
resulting restriction Kc - Ks - k < 0 is assumed to hold. The expected payoff Π(S*) can, using 
equations (4) and (5), be calculated as: 
0
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The expected payoff of refraining from a severance pay offer and dismissing the employee 
without  monetary  compensation  is  given  by  Π(0)  =  -p 0 - (1 - p)(C + Kc) - Kn.  Using 
equation (1), Π(0) can be expressed as: 
0 n K
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Finally, the firm's expected payoff of proceeding in line with PaDA Sec. 1a equals Π(Z): 
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The probability r of a severance pay offer based on PaDA Sec. 1a being accepted will only be 
less than unity if C > Z + f holds (cf. equation (3)). This implies that Z < C and that the term  
Z - C - Kc is negative.  
 
3.2 The Firm's Preferred Dismissal Procedure 
In the first step of the game, the firm decides whether it will attempt to dismiss the employee 
without a severance pay, propose a mutual agreement or proceed in accordance with PaDA 
Sec. 1a. To analyse this decision, we compare the firm's expected payoffs resulting from each 
choice  and  clarify  that,  depending  on  parameter  values,  each  choice  can  be  optimal. 
Accordingly, assuming the economy to be populated by a large number of firms characterised 
by  different  values  of  the  costs  Kn,  Kc,  and  Ks,  all  types  of  dismissals  will  occur  in 
equilibrium. We can summarise our findings in the following three Remarks: 
Remark 1: Mutual Agreement versus Outright Dismissal 
a) The firm is more likely to make an offer S* instead of dismissing the employee without the 
odder of a payment, the higher the costs Kn are.   
b) If Ks = Kc =  k, Kn = 0, and the probability p of a dismissal without severance payment 
being accepted is greater than pcrit = 1 -  3 /2, the firm will be better off as a result of 
refraining  from  making  an  offer  instead  of  suggesting  a  mutual  agreement  including  a 
payment S*.  
Proof: 
Let the difference between expected payoffs resulting from an offer S* and those from 
no offer be denoted by   Π(S, 0) := Π(S*) - Π(0). A positive difference indicates a 
higher payoff of offering S*, since Π(S*), Π(0) < 0. The difference is given by: 
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Clearly,  Π(S, 0) is increasing in Kn. Substituting k for Ks and Kc in (9) and using the 
definition of p (cf. equation (1)), the payoff difference can be rewritten as: 
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The  expression  in  square  brackets  in  equation  (10)  and,  therefore,  also   Π(S, 0)  is 
positive, given Kn = 0, for any probability p greater than pcrit = 1 -  3 /2 ≈ 0.134. ■ 
Remark 1 implicitly clarifies the trade-off faced by a firm prior to the introduction of PaDA 
Sec. 1a. Part b) of Remark 1, for example, implies that an employee who can expect only a 
low expected payment C when going to court and, therefore, exhibits a high probability p of 
accepting  a  dismissal  without  a  severance  payment,  is  unlikely  to  be  offered  a  mutual 
agreement including a payment S* by the firm. Therefore, Remark 1 captures the shadow of 
employment protection law in the determination of voluntary severance payments and a firm's 
choice of dismissal procedure.  
Next, we will analyse whether the use of PaDA Sec. 1a can be beneficial for a firm, relative to 
a dismissal without a severance pay offer. The findings can be summarised in: 
Remark 2: Using PaDA Sec. 1a versus Outright Dismissal 
a) The firm is more likely to make an offer in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a than to dismiss 
the employee without making any offer, the higher the employee's non-monetary gain f is.  
b) If Kc =  k, the firm will be better off as a result of dismissing an employee in accordance 
with PaDA Sec. 1a than not making an offer. 
Proof: 
Let the difference between expected payoffs resulting from an offer Z and those from a 
dismissal without an offer be denoted by  Π(Z, 0) := Π(Z) - Π(0). This is given by: 
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Since (Z - C - Kc) < 0,  Π(Z, 0) is increasing in f. Substituting k for Kc in (11), setting 
f = 0, and using the definitions of p and r (cf. equations (1) and (3)), we obtain: 
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Remark 2 shows that if the costs of a court procedure are sufficiently high, the firm will find a 
dismissal according to  PaDA Sec. 1a  cheaper  than firing the employee without an initial 
severance pay offer.  
Finally, we will compare the firm's expected payoff from offering a payment S* to obtain a 
mutual agreement with that of proceeding in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a. 
Remark 3: Mutual Agreement versus Using PaDA Sec. 1a 
Assume Ks = Kc =  k. A sufficient condition for the firm to benefit from proceeding in 
accordance  with  PaDA  Sec.  1a  instead  of  proposing  a  mutual  agreement  including  a 
severance pay offer S* is that the probability r of the firm's offer according to PaDA Sec. 1a 
being accepted does not fall below 25%. 
Proof: 
Let the difference between expected payoffs resulting from an offer Z and those from 
the proposal of a mutual agreement be denoted by  Π(Z, S) := Π(Z) - Π(S*). Using 
equation (3),  Π(Z, S) can be expressed as: 
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Since C > Z holds, given a positive probability 1 - r of a proposal in accordance with 
PaDA Sec. 1a being rejected,  Π(Z, S) will be unambiguously positive for r ≥ 0.25. ■  
For Ks = 0, a sufficiently high value of Kc (<  k), that is, of the costs of a court procedure, 
ensures that  Π(Z, S) < 0 and, thus, that the firm prefers to offer a payment S* (instead of Z > 
S*), because this reduces the costs of a payment sufficiently to overcompensate for the fall in 
the acceptance probability from r to q (given f = 0, cf. equations (1) and (3)). Accordingly,   14 
Remark 3 has the same flavour as Remark 2. Firms may – but need not – find it profitable to 
use PaDA Sec. 1a instead of the alternative, i.e. voluntarily offering a payment S*.
14 
Remarks 1 to 3 show that there are values of Kn, Kc, and Ks characterising the firm and of k 
and  C  relating  to  the  employee  which  ensure  that  a  firm  may  find  either  of  the  three 
procedures to terminate an employment relationship the least costly. The intuition for the 
relevance  of  PaDA  Sec.  1a  is  the  following.  First,  using  the  procedure  lowers  the  firm's 
administrative costs, relative to a mutual agreement or a court procedure (by assumption). 
Second, if the employee accepts the offer Z, the payment will be less than that resulting from 
a court's involvement. Third, for a given payment, the acceptance probability q exceeds the 
probability r because of the gain f. However, proceeding in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a 
also  entails  two  disadvantages.  By  offering  Z,  firms  forego  the  possibility  of  avoiding  a 
payment, if the employee would have accepted a dismissal without a severance pay offer. In 
addition, Z will generally diverge from the 'optimal' offer S*. The firm will make use of 
PaDA  Sec.  1a  if  the  disadvantages  are  outweighted  by  the  aforementioned  cost-reducing 
effects.  
 
3.3 Non-controversial Payments and Expected Severance Payments 
In our data we have information on whether a dismissed employee claims to have received a 
severance payment as a result of a mutual agreement with the employer. We interpret such a 
statement as tantamount to the information that the severance payment did not result from a 
labour court suit, because filing a suit implies rejecting the conditions attached to the firm's 
dismissal  decision.  Furthermore,  employees  can  state  that  they  experienced  a  layoff. 
Severance payments in such an event may also occur without a court being involved. In our 
theoretical model, such non-controversial payments will, prior to the introduction of PaDA 
Sec. 1a, be given by S*. Since 2004, a non-controversial payment can arise either because the 
firm proposes a mutual agreement including a payment S*, which the employee accepts, or 
because the firm proposes a termination of the employment contract in line with PaDA Sec. 
1a, which the employee does not object to. In this case, the severance payment amounts to Z. 
Since the optimal payment S* is unaffected by the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a (cf. equation 
(5)), the expected level of non-controversial payments will fall (rise) with the introduction of 
PaDA Sec. 1a if S* > (<) Z. 
                                                 
14 Note that if, in contrast to our assumption, the costs Ks arose also if the offer of a mutual agreement were 
declined, the condition for the firm to prefer PaDA Sec. 1a relative to a mutual agreement would more likely to 
hold than in the present set-up.   15 
The  assumption  that  the  payment  Z  defined  by  PaDA  Sec.  1a  is  less  than  the  severance 
payments  S*  has  sometimes  been  interpreted  as  being  equivalent  to  a  loss  of  workers. 
However, since not only the level of payments may change – from C or S* to Z – but also the 
probability  of  obtaining  such  payments,  a  more  adequate  measure  of  the  change  in  the 
worker's  wellbeing  is  the  expected  severance  payment.  Let  A  denote  the  probability  that 
proposing a mutual agreement generates a higher expected payoff for the firm than dismissing 
the employee without severance pay offer, i.e., that  Π(S, 0) > 0. The expected or average 
severance payment Pb of a dismissed employee, prior to the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a, 
can be expressed as: 
[ ] C ) p 1 )( A 1 ( C *)) S ( q 1 ( * S *) S ( q A b P - - + - + =         (15) 
Let the probability that the firm offers a payment Z – subsequent to the introduction of PaDA 
Sec. 1a – be given by  B. Put differently, B represents the probability  that  Π(Z, S) and  
 Π(Z,  0)  are  positive.  Because  the  optimal  severance  pay  offer  S*  is  unaffected,  the 
probability A that  Π(S, 0) > 0 holds is independent of the existence of PaDA Sec. 1a. In 
addition, the expected payment C resulting from filing a suit remains unchanged, since the 
legal evaluation of a case is not altered. In consequence, the expected or average severance 
payment Ps of a dismissed employee since the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a equals: 
[ ] b P ) B 1 ( C ) r 1 ( rZ B s P - + - + =           (16) 
The difference in expected severance payments due to the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a is 
given by Ps – Pb, or in other terms, determined by: 
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This expression may be positive or negative, suggesting that dismissed employees may lose or 
gain due to the introduction of PADA Sec. 1a. For an example indicating that employees may 
gain, note that the last term in the last line of equation (17) is negative and deducted, given a 
probability q(S*) < 1 (cf. equations (2) and (5)). Ps > Pb will then unambiguously apply if rZ 
+ (p(1 - A) - r)C > 0 holds. However, assuming Z = S* = C/2 and f = 0 implies that r = q.   16 
Making use of r = p – Z/k and substituting in the second line of equation (17) for S*, C, p 
and r, we can show that the sign of equation (17) is determined by (1 - Z/k), which may be 
positive or negative. Accordingly, whether a dismissed worker has lost or gained owing to the 
new section in the PaDA is an empirical issue. We summarise our findings in: 
Proposition 1 
Assume  that  some  firms  dismiss  workers  in  accordance  with  PaDA  Sec.  1a.  Non-
controversial  severance  payments,  i.e.  those  resulting  without  a  court's  involvement,  will 
decline  on  average  with  the  introduction  of  PaDA  Sec.  1a  if  S*  >  Z.  Average  observed 
severance  payments  in  the  case  of  individual  dismissals  may  rise  or  fall  due  to  the 
introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a.  
In summary, the model casts doubts on the assertions often found in legal interpretations that 
PaDA Sec. 1a will either have no impact or will clearly make dismissed workers better off as 
a result of the new section establishing a lower boundary for severance payments.  
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Data 
Our data stems from the German Socio-Economic panel (SOEP) which is a representative 
longitudinal survey of the resident population in Germany conducted since 1984 (cf. Wagner, 
Frick and Schupp (2007) or http://www.diw.de/de/soep). We use data from the survey years 
2000 to 2007 to extract a sample of observed terminations of employment contracts in West 
Germany from January 2001 to December 2006. This allows us to set up a symmetric three-
year time period around the date when PaDA Sec. 1a was introduced on 1 January, 2004. 
Moreover, we restrict ourselves to terminations in firms with at least 5 employees because the 
PaDA was never applicable if there had been fewer employees. We include observed contract 
terminations due to a closure of the firm or plant, a layoff and a mutual agreement. In all these 
events, PaDA Sec. 1a may have affected the level of severance payments. However, our data 
provides no information on whether a labour suit was filed or not. Those civil servants which 
can  effectively  not  be  dismissed  ('Beamte'),  apprentices,  and  employees  with  temporary 
contracts or going into retirement are excluded from our data. Additionally, we require all 
respondents to be over the age of 17 and no older than 65 years, and to have either a full- or 
part-time job. Given the panel structure of the SOEP, it is feasible to link the information on 
employment terminations with information regarding individual characteristics (such as the   17 
type of job or tenure) and firm features. Finally, we use weighting factors provided with the 
SOEP, which account for the sample design of the different sub-samples of the SOEP as well 
as for panel attrition in all empirical analyses (cf. Pannenberg et al. 2005).  
Information on severance payments comes from a question on the prevalence and amount of 
such  payments.  For  N = 244  (Nbefore  2004 = 135;  Nsince  2004 = 109)  employees  with  job 
terminations we have valid observations on severance payments. The average real severance 
pay equals € 13,841 (median = € 8,084).
15 In our empirical work we additionally use some 
variables based on the information provided in the last survey prior to the termination of the 
employment contract. These variables either reflect legal regulations or have been found in 
other studies to determine severance payments in Germany (cf. Section 2.1 above and, e.g., 
Goerke and Pannenberg 2010a). They include tenure, the interaction of age and tenure in 
accordance with the limits stipulated by the PaDA [age in years ≥ 50 (55) and tenure ≥ 15 
(20) years], dummy variables for gender, the existence of alimony duties and for officially 
recognised disability status, measures for firm size (5 – 19, 20 – 199, 200 – 1999, 2000 or 
more  employees),  occupational  status  (blue  collar/  white  collar)  and  the  type  of  job 
termination (firm or plant closure, layoff, mutual agreement).  
 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
To estimate the effect of the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a on severance payments, we use a 
difference-in-differences-strategy (DID). As described above, WCA Sec. 112(a) stipulates the 
obligation to set up a social plan in the case of a mass dismissal. Such social plans typically 
contain  generous  and  detailed  guidelines  on  severance  payments  and  employers  cannot 
circumvent them by using PaDA Sec. 1a. Hence, PaDA Sec. 1a should have had no direct 
impact on severance payments based on social plans. We exploit this hypothesis and use 
observed severance payments in those cases of collective dismissals in which WCA Sec. 112 
is applicable as a control group in our DID-specifications.  
In our data we can distinguish between three types of job terminations: those due to a (a) 
closure of the firm or plant; (b) layoff; (c) mutual agreement. The category "closure of the 
firm or plant" clearly includes collective dismissals. However, it is essential for the validity of 
our  empirical  strategy  that  the  control  group  consists  only  of  such  employees  who  are 
collectively dismissed in a firm with 20 or more employees in which a works council exists. 
Unfortunately, information on the existence of a works council is only available for the SOEP 
                                                 
15 The CPI is used to calculate real severance payments (base year 2000).    18 
survey years 2001 and 2006. To construct such a works council indicator for every year from 
2001 to 2006 in our sample, we use observations from the years 2001 and 2006 to estimate 
the parameters of a probit model of the likelihood of a works council existing in the particular 
firm.
16  Subsequently,  we  use  these  parameter  estimates  to  calculate  "out  of  sample" 
predictions, as well as an estimated dummy variable, "existence of a works council", for the 
years 2002 to 2005, for which information on the existence of a works council is missing.
17 In 
our sample, the resulting estimated fraction of employees working in firms with a works 
council for the years 2001 to 2006 amounts to 47%. This number is almost identical to the 
estimate  of  48%  provided  by  Ellguth  and  Kohaut  (2010)  for  the  same  period  based  on 
representative firm panel data for West Germany.  
In sum, our control group consists of those respondents receiving a severance payment for 
whom, first, we observe a job termination due to a "closure of the firm" and who, second, 
worked in a firm with 20 or more employees in which a works council existed, as can be 
observed for the years 2001 and 2006 and (partly) estimated for the period 2002 to 2005. All 
other observed job terminations due to the closure of a firm are (re-) classified as layoffs. 
Severance  payments  in  the  case  of  layoffs  and  mutual  agreements  to  terminate  an 
employment contract may be affected by the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a and, therefore, 
define two separate treatment groups.  
To  assess  the  (short-run)  effect  of  the  introduction  of  PaDA  Sec.  1a  on  the  amount  of 
severance pay, we use the following DID-regression specification:  
0 1 2 it
5 3 4
it it
y (mutual agreement*since 2004) (individual layoff *since 2004)
  ß (since 2004) (mutual agreement) (individual layoff)
  x
= a +b +b
+ +b +b
+ g+e
    (18) 
where yit represents the log of real severance payments; β1, β2 are the key parameters of 
interest, indicating a causal effect of the introduction of PaDA Sec.1 on severance payments 
for dismissed employees who obtained the payments due to a mutual agreement, or because 
of a layoff; and xit (g) is a vector of control variables (parameters). 
The key identifying assumption of equation (18) is that severance payment trends would be 
the  same  for  all  groups  in  the  absence  of  treatment,  i.e.  if  PaDA  Sec.  1a  had  not  been 
                                                 
16 The estimated parameters of the probit model are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
17 For the years 2002 to 2005 the dummy variable "existence of a works council" equals 1 if the predicted 
individual probability of  working in a firm in  which a works council exists is greater than or equal to the 
respective unconditional (predicted) fraction.    19 
introduced.
18 This implies that there are no other events that occurred around the year 2004, 
when  the  PaDA  was  altered,  that  affected  treatment  and  control  groups  differently. 
Importantly, the WCA was not amended after 2002. As described above, two policy changes 
took  place  during  the  period  under  consideration:  namely,  changes  in  the  taxation  of 
severance pay and a reform of the unemployment benefit system. In our checks of robustness 
below we analyse their possible impact by allowing for further interaction terms in our DID-
specifications. Furthermore, we investigate whether there was an effect resulting from the 
change in the applicability of the PaDA that exempted most employees in firms with five or 
more but less than 10 employees. 
 
5. Results 
Figure 2 depicts the development of average real severance pay over time for employees 
characterised by different types of job terminations. The figure indicates a comprehensive and 
remarkable increase in the level of payments since 2004. Respondents who experienced a 
layoff (+ 88%) or signed a mutual agreement (+ 62%) exhibited a more pronounced rise than 
employees belonging to the control group, which encompasses those people with job losses 
resulting from collective dismissals (+ 42%). Note, that these results might be (partly) driven 
by  composition  effects.  Therefore,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  regression-adjusted 
results from the DID-specification confirm the descriptive evidence.  
- Figure 2: Average Amount of Real Severance Pay -  
Table 1 displays parameter estimates of the DID-specification of equation (18). The estimated 
parameters of the two interactions we are primarily interested in, namely since_04*mutual 
agreement and since_04*individual layoff, are both significantly negative. They indicate that 
both groups of dismissed employees, who may have been confronted with a severance pay 
offer in accordance with PaDA Sec. 1a, have seen notable reductions in the level of severance 
payments since 2004, relative to the comparison group of respondents who experienced a 
collective  dismissal.  Furthermore,  the  estimated  parameter  of  the  time  dummy  since_04 
indicates  that  severance  payments  have  increased  since  2004,  which  is  in  line  with  the 
descriptive evidence displayed in Figure 2 and also with estimates by Jahn (2009). 
- Table 1: DID-Estimates of Severance Pay and PaDA Sec. 1a -  
                                                 
18 Blundell and Costas-Dias (2009), for example, provide a detailed discussion of the key assumptions of the 
DID-approach.    20 
The  parameter  estimates  for  the  set  of  control  variables  are  consistent  with  evidence 
previously obtained (see, e.g., Grund (2006), Jahn (2005, 2009), and Goerke and Pannenberg 
(2009, 2010a). In particular, we find a positive correlation with the last wage, tenure, and the 
existence  of  alimony  obligations,  whereas  gender  has  no  significant  impact.  Employees 
belonging to the two age-tenure groups defined by the PaDA (i.e. those above 50 (55) years of 
age and having a tenure of more than 15 (20) years), experience a decline in the level of 
payments, relative to the control group. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the elasticity of 
severance pay with respect to the last wage is significantly greater than unity and that the 
impact of tenure on severance pay is non-linear. 
As mentioned above, two potentially relevant policy changes took place around the time when 
PaDA Sec. 1a was introduced. The first was a change in taxation. Income tax exemption 
thresholds for severance pay were reduced by larger absolute amounts for the two age-tenure 
groups (age ³ 50 years & tenure ³ 15 years and age ³ 55 years & tenure ³ 20 years) than for 
the majority of employees and were completely abolished for all employees at the beginning 
of 2006. Exploiting a former increase in the taxation of severance pay in 1999, Goerke and 
Pannenberg (2009) show that it (a) lowered the probability of receiving severance pay and (b) 
tended to reduce the level of severance payments for the two age-tenure groups entitled to 
higher tax exemption levels as well as to higher upper limits of severance payments according 
to the PaDA (age ³ 50 years & tenure ³ 15 years and age ³ 55 years & tenure ³ 20 years). To 
tackle the question of whether our main results are influenced by the change in taxation, we 
add  the  following  two  triple  interaction  terms  to  equation  (18):  since_04*mutual 
agreement*[(age ³ 50 years & tenure ³ 15 years) or (age ³ 55 years & tenure ³ 20 years)] 
and since_04*individual layoff*[(age ³ 50 years & tenure ³ 15 years) or (age ³ 55 years & 
tenure ³ 20 years)]. The results displayed in the upper part of Table 2 show that the estimated 
parameters for the two interactions of main interest remain significantly negative, while the 
additionally estimated parameters of the two triple interactions are not significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, we continue to find evidence for a relative drop in severance pay for the 
two groups of employees who may have been affected by PaDA Sec. 1a.
19 
- Table 2: Checks of Robustness -  
                                                 
19 Table 2 contains only information on the estimated parameters for variables capturing the impact of PaDA 
Sec.1a. The findings  for the further covariates resemble  those displayed in Table 1 and are available upon 
request from the authors.   21 
A second concern relates to the reform of the unemployment benefit system in Germany, 
which became effective in February 2006 and significantly reduced the entitlement period for 
older workers. There is evidence of an anticipation effect because entries into unemployment 
peaked during the months preceding the reform (cf. Dlugosz, Stephan and Wilke 2009). This 
anticipation effect might influence our results due to its potential impact on the outcome of a 
bargain between the firm and employee regarding severance pay. In terms of our theoretical 
model, the legal change could violate the assumption that income subsequent to a dismissal is 
determined only by severance pay. In order to cater for the possible effect of the alteration of 
the unemployment benefit system, we enhance our baseline specification equation (18) by 
adding two triple interaction terms, namely since_04*mutual agreement*(age ³ 45 years) and 
since_04*individual layoff*(age ³ 45 years), as well as the main effect age ³ 45 years. The 
reason is that workers below the age of 45 were not affected by the 2006 change of the 
unemployment benefit entitlement period. Moreover, they are less likely to become long-term 
unemployed than workers of higher age and, thus, unlikely to be affected by the introduction 
of Arbeitslosengeld II directly. Finally, workers less than 45 years of age belong to the group 
of income tax payers who experienced the smallest increase in the taxation of severance pay.  
The estimated parameters in the lower part of Table 2 indicate that the reduction in severance 
pay since 2004 is less pronounced for older workers having experienced a layoff, but that 
there  are  no  heterogeneous  effects  with  respect  to  the  group  with  mutual  agreements. 
Moreover,  the  estimated  parameters  of  the  two  variables  since_04*mutual  agreement  and 
since_04*individual layoff we are mainly interested in, are again significantly negative.
20 
As  mentioned  in  Section  2,  the  amendments  to  the  PaDA  in  2004  included  not  only  the 
addition of Sec. 1a but also an increase in the threshold of the number of employees who have 
to work in the firm in order to make the PaDA applicable (Sec. 23 PaDA). In particular, 
employees in firms with more than five but not more than ten employees were no longer 
covered by the regulations of the PaDA, unless they had already been working in that firm in 
2003.  As  a  further  check  of  robustness,  it  would  be  desirable  to  re-run  our  empirical 
specifications based on a sample of employees who worked in firms in which the PaDA had 
always been applicable, that is, those with a staff of more than 10  employees. However, 
sufficiently detailed firm size information has only been available in the SOEP since 2004. 
Therefore, we have restricted our sample to dismissed employees who obtained a severance 
                                                 
20 The estimated parameter of the main effect, age ≥ 45, is not significantly different from zero (see below). Note 
that  age  will  have  no  significant  impact  either  if  we  include  a  linear  age  term  in  any  of  the  empirical 
specifications used in the paper.    22 
payment and worked in a firm with twenty or more employees, since this firm size variable is 
on hand for the entire observation period. Our findings, particularly for the interaction terms 
of main interest, were virtually unchanged when limiting the sample in this manner. 
In sum, we find across all specifications that respondents with contract terminations due to a 
mutual agreement or a layoff experienced a notable reduction in the level of severance pay 
after the reform of the PaDA, relative to the payments obtained by the respondents belonging 
to the control group. Furthermore, before 2004 severance pay factors characterising payments 
in the case of job losses due to layoffs or mutual agreements were generally above 0.5, the 
value  defined  by  PaDA  Sec.  1a.
21  Severance  payments  resulting  from  mutual  agreements 
clearly  constitute  non-controversial  payments.  Moreover,  also  in  the  case  of  layoffs 
agreements  about  severance  pay  without  a  court's  involvement  are  of  great  relevance. 
Therefore, S* > Z is likely to hold and the results reported are in line with Proposition 1 of 
our theoretical model with respect to non-controversial severance payments.  
Moreover, we find in our data that the probability of obtaining a severance payment when 
experiencing a layoff or due to a mutual agreement is virtually the same for the period prior to 
2004 as for the three years following the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a. Therefore, the average 
level of severance pay a dismissed employee obtained in the case of an individual dismissal 
did  not  change  because  of  a  variation  in  the  probabilities  of  obtaining  the  respective 
payments. We can, therefore, conclude that the expected amount of severance payments is 
likely to have fallen since 2004 for those workers who lost their job because of either  a 
mutual agreement to terminate the contract or a layoff, relative to the expected payoff of 
dismissed workers not directly affected by PaDA Sec. 1a. In terms of our theoretical model, 
this interpretation implies that Pb > Ps. In consequence, and in contrast to the fears of some 
legal scholars and also economists, the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a has not been beneficial 
for dismissed employees.  
 
6. Summary  
Before and also subsequent to the introduction of PaDA Sec. 1a it was claimed by a large 
number of primarily legal scholars that the new section in the law would have no effect on the 
level of employment protection legislation in Germany in general and on severance payments 
in particular. The argument put forward was that the outcome of the new regulation could 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Jahn (2005) and Grund (2006). In our data we calculate severance pay factors from 2001 to 
2003 of 0.68 (0.52) for mutual agreements (layoffs).   23 
already have been obtained prior to the amendment. Alternatively, some experts argued that 
the level of severance pay defined by PaDA Sec. 1a constituted a lower threshold, while the 
German Trade Union Federation feared a deterioration of the employees' position. We show 
in a theoretical model that firms are likely to use the new procedure to dismiss workers, given 
that dismissal costs and the employees' willingness to accept a dismissal are affected by the 
new  section  in  the  PaDA.  Furthermore,  the  theoretical  model  illustrates  that  severance 
payments obtained without a court's involvement and also average payments may decline with 
the introduction of the law. In our empirical analysis we use data from the Socio-Economic 
Panel for West Germany for a three-year period extending prior to and following the law's 
amendment in 2004. We show that severance payments obtained by dismissed employees 
who may have been affected by the new regulation declined, relative to payments obtained by 
a control group, whose payments resulted from a social plan to which PaDA Sec. 1a is not 
applicable. We therefore conclude that the change in the PaDA made employees worse off 
who  may  have  obtained  a  severance  payment  in  accordance  with  the  new  section  of  the 
PaDA,  relative  to  those  not  directly  affected  by  the  legal  change.  Although  variations  in 
severance payments only provide indirect evidence, our findings suggest that the claim was 
unfounded  that  the  new  procedure  will  not  be  used.  Rather,  the  fear  articulated  by  the 
Confederation  of  German  Trade  Unions  that  employees  would  suffer  from  the  law's 
amendment appears to be justified. 
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Figure 2: Average Amount of Real Severance Pay  
 
SOEP 2001-2006. N = 244. Survey weights are used. 
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Table 1: DID-Estimates of Severance Pay and PaDA Sec. 1a  
 
Variable   Coefficient  Standard Error 
Since_04 * mutual agreement   -0.769**  0.238    
Since_04 * individual layoff  -0.439*  0.219    
Individual layoff  0.137  0.164 
Mutual agreement  0.324*  0.149 
Since_04  0.483*  0.189 
Last real monthly wage (log)  1.264**  0.118 
Tenure of last job  0.170**  0.018 
Tenure of last job squared  -0.003**  0.001   
Male  -0.135  0.104 
Alimony  0.218
+   0.112 
Firm size:   20 £ X < 200 employees  -0.080  0.132 
Firm size: 200 £ X < 2000 employees  0.167  0.133 
Firm size: X ³ 2000 employees  0.090  0.120 
White collar worker  0.063  0.120 
Handicap  0.251  0.152   
Age ³ 50 years & tenure ³ 15 years  -0.913**  0.170 
Age ³ 55 years & tenure ³ 20 years  -0.538*  0.233 
Constant  -2.373**  0.917 
Wald_X (df)  736.1** (22) 
R
2  0.77 
Number of observations  244 
Source: SOEP 2000-2007. Survey weights are used.  
OLS: Dependent variable: (Log) real amount of severance pay. 
Significance level: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10). 
Industry dummy variables included.  
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Table 2: Checks of Robustness 
 
Variable   Coefficient  Standard Error 
Controlling for additional tax/tenure group interactions 
Since_04 * mutual agreement   -0.595**  0.221     
Since_04 * individual layoff  -0.499*  0.223     
Since_04 * mutual agreement *  
[(age ³ 50 & tenure ³ 15) or (age ³ 55 & tenure ³ 20)] 
-0.460  0.296  
Since_04 * individual layoff * 
[(age ³ 50 & tenure ³ 15) or (age ³ 55 & tenure ³ 20)]  
0.319  0.244   
Mutual agreement  0.333*  0.149      
Individual layoff  0.169  0.163      
Age ≥ 50 years & tenure ≥ 15 years  -0.944**  0.170     
Age ≥ 55 years & tenure ≥ 20 years  -0.525*  0.233     
Since_04  0.489*  0.188      
Wald_X (df)  840.0** (24) 
R
2  0.78 
Number of observations  244 
Controlling for additional age group interactions 
Since_04 * mutual agreement   -0.515*  0.258    
Since_04 * individual layoff  -0.595*  0.240    
Since_04 * mutual agreement * (age ≥ 45 years)  -0.214  0.250   
Since_04 * individual layoff * (age ≥ 45 years)  0.352+  0.200  
Mutual agreement  0.254+  0.153     
Individual layoff  0.126  0.165      
Age ≥ 45 years  -0.212  0.141     
Since_04  0.467*  0.196  
Wald_X (df)  743.75** (25) 
R
2  0.78 
Number of observations  244 
Source: SOEP 2000-2007. Survey weights are used.  
OLS: Dependent variable: (Log) real amount of severance pay. 
Significance level: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10). 
Industry dummy variables included. 
Further control variables: see Table 1.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Determinants of the Existence of a Works Council 
 
Variable   Coefficient  Standard Error 
Tenure of last job  0.056*  0.023 
Firm size:   20 £ X < 200 employees  -0.099  0.681  
Firm size: 200 £ X < 2000 employees  0.754  0.649  
Firm size: X ³ 2000 employees  0.632  0.729  
Other industries  0.297  1.048   
Chemical industry  -0.022  0.698    
Retail/ Banking/ Insurance  0.263  0.540   
Metal/ Electrical industry  1.406*  0.573  
Public Sector/ Transport  1.922**  0.666   
Schleswig Holstein/ Hamburg  0.564  0.589  
Lower Saxony  0.424  0.601  
North Rhine Westphalia  0.370  0.581      
Hesse  0.689  0.689   
Rhineland-Palatinate/ Saarland  1.341
+  0.698 
Baden-Württemberg  0.106  0.847      
Constant  -1.96*  0.755  
Wald_X (df)  27.22* (15) 
Pseudo-R
2  0.38 
Number of observations  78 
Source: SOEP 2001 and 2006.  Survey weights are used.  
 Probit-model with dependent variable: works council exists within firm (0/1) 
 Significance level: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.10). 
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